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Abstract—Along with the invention of computers and intercon-
nected networks, physical societal notions like security, trust, and
privacy entered the digital environment. The concept of digital
environments begins with the trust (established in the real world)
in the organisation/individual that manages the digital resources.
This concept evolved to deal with the rapid growth of the Internet,
where it became impractical for entities to have prior offline (real
world) trust. The evolution of digital trust took diverse approaches
and now trust is defined and understood differently across
heterogeneous domains. This paper looks at digital trust from the
point of view of security and examines how valid trust approaches
from other domains are now making their way into secure
computing. The paper also revisits and analyses the Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) along with associated technologies and
their relevance in the changing landscape. We especially focus
on the domains of cloud computing, mobile computing and
cyber-physical systems. In addition, the paper also explores our
proposals that are competing with and extending the traditional
functionality of TPM specifications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reliance on computers and related services has increased
since their inception. Computers now form large intercon-
nected networks that consist of sub-networks managed and
operated by divergent organisations. In a restricted network en-
vironment, where all participants were vetted (offline) before-
hand, managing security and trust was comparatively straight-
forward. However, with increased complexities in networked
systems and participants, offline vetting became impractical in
some cases. Therefore, technological means were required to
assess and associate trust with individual entities. In this paper,
the trust established using technological means, in whole or
in part, is referred to as “digital trust”.
Similar to the diversification of computer systems, digital
trust also came in several different incarnations. Each comput-
ing domain defined and articulated the notion of digital trust
in a specific manner that satisfied its requirements. Therefore,
the assumption that digital trust will have a single definition is
difficult to substantiate. Individual definitions of digital trust
might be valid in their respective domains. However, issues
arise when a definition of trust in one domain is applied
to a different domain without adequately adjusting it, as for
example, in the notion of digital trust related to computer
security via provenance [1, 2]. Such concerns are rare but
nonetheless exist.
*This work is a position paper that discusses notion of trust in different
computing fields. It also analyses our proposals for emerging fields.
In the field of information security, the measurement and
validation of digital trust and trustworthiness play crucial
roles. The foundation of secure and trusted computing1 can
be argued to be based on the effectiveness of digital trust
evaluation and validation mechanisms [7]. With increased
reliance on on-demand and ubiquitous services, connecting
with a wide range of devices that might not be under the
control of a particular organisation / individual is becoming
commonplace. In such a chaotic and ever-changing environ-
ment, dynamic establishment and verification / validation of
digital trust is crucial. The need for digital trust will only grow
with increasing adoption of cloud computing, mobile platforms
and Cyber-Physical System (CPS).
A. Contribution of Paper
In this paper, to give an overview of digital trust, we revisit
the variance in the notion of digital trust in selected domains of
computer science. The crux of the paper is the argument that
digital trust in security and privacy services provides secure
and trusted computing — which is difficult to achieve without
a trusted entity/platform. Furthermore, system architects and
implementors should also understand the subtle differences
between the notion of the trust in security and other computing
domains. This paper also provides a brief survey of the trust
and trustworthiness in the context of security and privacy
services. In addition, the paper evaluates the state-of-the-art
of trusted computing, issues related to its slow adoption and
whether traditional trusted computing is relevant to future
computing paradigms. It also presents the challenges faced
by digital trust for security and privacy services in mobile
environments, cloud computing [8] and embedded platforms
(Internet of things [9], Cyber-Physical Systems [10]). We
provide a brief description of our proposals for potential future
incarnations of digital trust in the field of trusted computing,
along with open research questions.
B. Structure of Paper
Section II explores the definition of digital trust across
a selected subset of computer domains. In section III, the
paper discusses the trusted computing initiative, associated
1Secure and Trusted Computing: This term refers to the efforts made toward
enabling technologies to ascertain trust in a device’s state and security in a
distributed environment. For example, Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [3,
4], ARM TrustZone [5] and M-Shield [6].
expectations and the reality of its slow adoption. Subsequently,
in section IV the paper evaluates the relevance of trusted
computing in future computing paradigms. In section V, our
proposed potential future architectures for trusted computing
are discussed. Finally in section VI, we list open research
questions and conclude the paper.
II. DIGITAL TRUST
The definition of trust, taken from Merriam Webster’s online
dictionary2 states that trust is a “belief that someone or
something is reliable, good, honest, effective, etc."
Based on this, we generically define digital trust as “a trust
based either on past experience or evidence that an entity has
behaved and/or will behave in accordance with the self-stated
behaviour.” The self-stated purpose of intent is provided by the
entity and this may have been verified/attested by a third party.
The claim that the entity satisfies the self-stated behaviour
can either be gained through past interactions (experience) or
based on some (hard) evidence like validatable / verifiable
properties certified by a reputable third party (i.e. Common
Criteria evaluation for secure hardware [11]). This definition
is not claimed to be a comprehensive definition for digital
trust that encompasses all of its facets. However, this generic
definition will be used as a point of discussion for the rest of
the paper.
In subsequent sections, we discuss the notion of digital trust
in different (selected) computer domains to show the variations
in the definition and application of trust.
A. Semantic Web
The semantic Web is the framework and associated ar-
chitecture that enables streamlined and flexible data sharing,
so the data can be machine processable, and consumed by
heterogeneous applications, beyond the boundaries of the
enterprises and communities from where the data originated
[12]. The notion of trust is a core component of the semantic
Web [13, 14] and in his earlier publications, Tim Berners-
Lee [14, 15] included the trust layer in the sematic Web stack
(see Figure 1) since its inception. Evidently, trust is not an
afterthought in the domain of the semantic Web.
To accept and rely on a source of data in the semantic
Web, consumers (applications and/or users) have to establish a
notion of trust in the data and possibly also in its source. The
information presented as part of the semantic Web should be
treated as “claims,” not facts [16]. Digital trust in the semantic
Web provides a level of confidence in a piece of information.
Proposed architectures for digital trust in the semantic Web
include reputation-, context- and content-based mechanisms.
The reputation-based mechanism uses rating mechanisms,
where either the information consumers or other websites rank
their confidence in an information source [13, 17]. These
include, for example, the rating systems used by eBay and
IMDB. A reputation-based mechanism requires information
2Website: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trust
Unicode URI
D
ig
it
al
 S
ig
n
at
u
re
RDF + rdfschema
Ontology vocabulary
Logic
Proof
Trust
XML + NS + xmlschema
Figure 1. Semantic Web Stack [15]
consumers to consistently provide ratings, which might be-
come an unnecessarily tedious and potentially bias-filled task
for them.
In context-based mechanisms, trust is based on the meta-
information that details the circumstances in which the in-
formation was provided [18]. The context stipulates meta-
information like who, what, when, where, why and how. It
also takes into account the authorship of the information. For
example, a product description published on its manufacturer’s
website will be trusted more than one published on a com-
petitor’s website. Another example is only accepting election
results from an official election organising body rather than
from any news sources.
Content-based trust mechanisms rely on the content of
information and trust rules/axioms [19] and may require
information to be presented by a number of notable and
independent resources (e.g. news outlets). The basic construct
of trust in the semantic Web is to establish the validity of the
presentation of openly accessible information.
B. Data Provenance
Data provenance can be understood as a snapshot of all
the transformations a data item has gone through during the
process that created the data item. In other words, as defined by
[20, 21] provenance is the meta-data of the derivation history
of data. Data provenance is an important component in many
data-intensive studies and/or industries like eScience [22] and
healthcare [23]. In such environments, provenance ensures the
quality of data and repeatability of results.
In the area of data provenance, trust is measured and
associated based on the history of the data. Trust measurement
is affected by questions like “who created the data,” “who
processed/modified it,” “what is the current state of the data”
and “(prior) trust in the data creator and processing entities”
[24, 25]. We can generalise that trust and measurement of
trustworthiness in a combined approach that includes rep-
utation (reputation of data sources and handlers), context
(operations performed on the data) and content (current state
of the data).
In some proposals [24] the security of the data origina-
tors/handlers is included, although the security evaluation is
not described. However, in a number of works related to trust
in data provenance, data quality and security of provenance
records are the main focus, not data security [26, 27].
C. Secure and Trusted Computing
In the real world, trust in an entity is based on a feature,
property or association that is entailed in it. In the computing
world, establishing trust in a distributed environment also fol-
lows the same assumptions. The concept of trusted platforms
is based on the existence of a trusted and reliable device that
provides evidence of the state of a given system. How this
evidence is interpreted is dependent on the requesting entity.
Trust in this context can be defined as an expectation that
the state of a system is as it is considered to be: secure.
This definition requires a trusted and reliable entity called
a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to provide trustworthy
evidence regarding the state of a system. Therefore, a TPM
is a reporting agent (witness) not an evaluator or enforcer of
the security policies. It provides a root of trust on which an
inquisitor relies for the validation of the current state of a
system.
The TPM specifications are maintained and developed by
an international standards group called the Trusted Computing
Group (TCG)3 Today, TCG not only publishes the TPM
specifications but also the Mobile Trusted Module (MTM),
Trusted Multi-tenant Infrastructure, and Trusted Network Con-
nect (TNC). With emerging technologies, service architectures,
and computing platforms, TCG is adapting to the challenges
presented by them.
1) Trusted Platform Framework: The basic framework for
the trusted platform is to have a root of trust (preferably in
hardware) and trust in it is necessary if an entity has to measure
the trustworthiness of a system. The root of trust in the TCG
specifications [3, 4] combines Root of Trust for Measurement
(RTM), Root of Trust for Storage (RTS), and Root of Trust
for Reporting (RTR). The RTM is an independent computing
platform that has a minimum set of instructions, which are
considered to be trusted for measuring the integrity matrix
of a system. On a typical desktop computer, the RTM will
be part of the BIOS (Basic Input Output System) and in
this scenario, it is referred to as the Core Root of Trust for
Measurement (CRTM). Where the RTS and RTR are based
on an independent, self-sufficient, and reliable computing
device that has a pre-defined set of instructions to provide
authentication and attestation functionality, such a device is
referred to as a Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
A platform can be considered a trusted platform if it has
a TPM and supporting architecture for the “Trusted Building
Block” (TBB). The TBB includes CRTM, physical connection
between a CRTM and the motherboard (of the platform),
connection between a TPM and the motherboard, and func-
tionality to detect physical presence. Physical presence implies
the direct interaction of a user with the platform, which is
traditionally based on a secret credential that in theory is only
3Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is the culmination of industrial efforts
that included the Trusted Computing Platform Association (TCPA), Mi-
crosoft’s Palladium, later called Next Generation Computing Base (NGSCB),
and Intel’s LaGrande. All of them proposed how to ascertain trust in a device’s
state in a distributed environment. These efforts were combined in the TCG
specification that resulted in the proposal of TPM.
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Figure 2. Trusted Platform Framework [28]
known to the user. By verifying the credentials, the platform
assumes that the platform owner is physically present. Figure
2 illustrates the trusted platform framework.
The trust boundary is a collection of the TBB and roots
of trust. A TPM extends the trust from roots of trust through
transitive or inductive trust. A transitive trust is a process that
enables a root of trust to provide a trustworthy description
(e.g. hash generation) of a second function (e.g. software).
The requesting entity can then verify whether it can trust
the second function based on the description provided by the
relevant TPM. The rationale behind transitive trust is that if
an entity trusts the TPM of a platform, it will also trust its
measurements.
In this section, the discussion of secure and trusted comput-
ing mainly focused on the TPM. There are other proposals for
secure and trusted computing but none has the status of the
TPM specifications. We will discuss a few of these proposals
in later sections, to contrast with the TPM architecture.
D. Trust and Trustworthiness
From the discussion in this section, we can delineate two
distinct types of trust frameworks: hard trust and soft trust.
The term hard trust refers to architectures that base the
measurement/foundation of trust on verifiable and indepen-
dently validated hardware (e.g. TPM [4], ARM TrustZone
[5]). In contrast, the term soft trust is associated with trust
measurement and assessment mechanisms that do not rely on
trusted hardware: examples of soft trust can be reputation-,
context- and content-based trust mechanisms.
Hybrid trust combines soft and hard trusts to provide a
potentially comprehensive approach. In the field of security,
a substantial number of trust proposals can be categorised as
hard trust. This is not to say that soft trust might not be valid or
applicable to the security domain [29, 30]. However, soft trust
on its own might not be a preferable approach to progressing
with secure and trusted computing. In the rest of the paper,
we discuss hard-trust based mechanisms for secure and trusted
computing.
Whether a soft, hard or hybrid trust approach is used, it can
be divided into two parts. First is the trusted measurement and
reporting framework and second is the mechanism to generate
a score. The generated score will represent the trustworthiness
of the relevant entity/information. Data provenance mecha-
nisms can be used to measure and report the state/quality of
the data [24, 31]. Based on these measurements and reports,
trustworthiness can be calculated; however, data provenance
does not become part of the calculations that ascertain the
trustworthiness of data. Similarly, TPM is a trusted and
secure measurement and reporting hardware system, where
the calculation of the trustworthiness of a system is left to
the inquirer (i.e. the entity that requests the integrity report
from the TPM) [32].
Therefore, security and reliability of the trust measurement
and reporting agent are as crucial as the trustworthiness of the
system. The basic premise is the invariability and effectiveness
of the measurement and reporting mechanism even when in
the control of a malicious entity. If a malicious entity can
influence the trust measurement and reporting mechanisms
then calculation of trustworthiness is of no value. For this
reason, hard trust is usually the preferred choice for providing
proof that the trust measurement and reporting mechanism is
reliable and tamper-resistant, satisfying the requirement for
an effective mechanism even when controlled by an active
adversary. The calculation of trustworthiness is dependent
on the evaluator and it might be independent of the trust
architecture — except for mechanisms that integrate hard
trust with reputation-based systems [29]. For example, if a
malicious user accepts an untrusted system as trusted, then
he/she is taking the risk. In such systems a malicious user
can still report that system ‘A’ is untrustworthy even when the
trustworthiness of system ‘A’ is high.
III. TRUST IN SECURITY AND PRIVACY
In this section, we briefly discuss the TPM and the Mobile
Trusted Module (MTM). Subsequently, we discuss the initial
promise of the trusted computing initiative and why in reality it
did not get the traction that was expected. Finally, we evaluate
the potential future of trusted computing.
A. Trusted Platform Module
The basic TPM architecture and its different components
are shown in Figure 3. For in-depth discussion of individual
components and their functionality please refer to [32, 33].
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Figure 3. Generic Architecture of Trusted Platform Module [4]
To describe how the TPM measures and reports trust
measurements, we restrict our discussion to measurement and
reporting operations only.
1) Secure Boot (Measurement Operation): When a user
boots up her computer, the first component to power up is
the system BIOS (Basic Input/Output System). On a trusted
platform, the boot sequence is initiated by the Core BIOS (i.e.
CRTM) that first measures its own integrity. This measurement
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Figure 4. Trusted Platform Boot Sequence
is stored in PCR-04 and later it is extended to include the
integrity measurement of the rest of the BIOS. The Core BIOS
then measures the motherboard configuration setting, and this
value is stored in PCR-1. After these measurements, the Core
BIOS will load the rest of the code of the BIOS.
The BIOS will subsequently measure the integrity of the
ROM firmware and ROM firmware configuration, storing
them in PCR-2 and PCR-3 respectively. At this stage, the
TBB is established and CRTM will proceed with integrity
measurement and loading of the Operating System (OS).
The CRTM measures the integrity of the “OS Loader Code,”
also termed the Initial Program Loader (IPL) and stores the
measurement in the PCR. The designated PCR index is left to
the discretion of the OS. Subsequently, it will execute the “OS
Loader Code” and on its successful execution, the TPM will
measure the integrity of the “OS Code”. After measurement is
taken and stored, the “OS Code” executes. Finally, the relevant
software that initiates its execution will first be subjected to
an integrity measurement, and values will be stored in a PCR
then sanctioned to execute. This process is shown in Figure 4,
which illustrates the execution flow and integrity measurement
storage.
By creating a daisy chain of integrity measurements, a TPM
provides a trusted and reliable view of the current state of the
system. Any software, whether part of an OS or an application,
has an integrity measurement stored in a PCR at a particular
index. If the value satisfies the requirement of the software or
requesting entity, then it can ascertain the trustworthiness of
the system or otherwise take action. As discussed before, a
TPM does not make any decision: it only measures, stores,
and reports integrity measurement in a secure and reliable
4Platform Configuration Register (PCR): A Platform Configuration Register
(PCR) is a 160-bit (20 bytes) data element that stores the result of the
integrity measurement, which is a generated hash of a given component
(e.g. BIOS, operating system, or an application). Therefore, a group of PCRs
form the integrity matrix. The process of extending PCR values is: PCRi
= Hash(PCR
′
i||X), where i is the PCR index, PCR′ i represents the old
value stored at index i, and X is the sequence to be included in the PCR
value. “||” indicates the concatenation of two data elements in the given order.
The starting value of all PCRs is set to zero.
manner. When a TPM reports the integrity measurement, it is
recommended that it should generate a signature on the value
- avoiding replay and man-in-the-middle attacks [4].
2) Reporting and Attestation Operations: The
attestation process, whether initiated by the relevant
user/administrator/third-party either locally or remotely,
involves the generation of a signature using the
respective Attestation Identification Key (AIK) on the
(associated/requested) PCR values [28]. The signature assures
requesters of the validity of the integrity measurement
stored in the PCRs. The choice of the AIK and PCR
index is dependent on the respective user, platform (OS) or
application.
B. Mobile Trusted Module
The growth of mobile computing platforms has encouraged
TCG to propose the Mobile Trusted Module (MTM). In this
section, we briefly discuss MTM architecture and operations,
along with how the MTM differs from the TPM.
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Figure 5. Possible (Generic) Architecture of Mobile Trusted Platform
1) Basic Architecture and Operations: The ecosystems
of mobile computing platforms (e.g. mobile phones, tablets,
PDAs) are fundamentally different from traditional platforms.
Therefore, while the architecture of the MTM has some
features from the TPM specification, it introduces new features
to support its target environment. The main changes introduced
in the MTM that make it different from the TPM specification
are stated below:
1) The MTM is required not only to perform integrity
measurement during the device bootup sequence, but
also to enforce a security policy that aborts the system
from initiating securely if it does not meet the trusted
(approved) state transition.
2) The MTM does not have to be in hardware: it is con-
sidered as a functionality, which can be implemented by
the device manufacturers as an add-on to their existing
architectures.
3) The MTM specification supports parallel instances of
MTM, associated with different stakeholders.
The MTM specification [34] is dynamic and scalable to
support the existence of multiple MTMs interlocked with each
other as shown in Figure 5. The MTM refers to them as
engines, where each of these engines is under the control
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of a stakeholder, including the device manufacturer (Device
Engine), Mobile Network Operator (Cellular Engine), Appli-
cation Provider (Application Engine), and User (User Engine);
as illustrated in Figure 5. A point to note is that each engine
is an abstraction of trusted services associated with a single
stakeholder. Therefore, on a mobile platform there can be a
single hardware system that supports the MTM functionality
and is accessed by different engines.
Each abstract engine on a mobile platform supports: 1) pro-
vision to implement trusted and non-trusted services (normal
services) associated with a stakeholder, 2) a self-test to ascer-
tain the trustworthiness of its own state, 3) storage of TPM
Endorsement Key (EK) (which is optional in MTM) and/or
AIKs, and 4) key migration.
We can further dissect each abstract engine as a component
of different services as shown in Figure 6. The non-trusted
services in an engine cannot access trusted resources directly.
They have to use the Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs) implemented by trusted services. Trusted resources,
including reporting, verification, and enforcement, are new
concepts that are introduced in the MTM specifications. The
MTM measurement and storage services shown in Figure 6
are similar to the TPMs discussed in previous sections.
The MTM specification defines two variants of the MTM
profile depending upon who is the owner of a particular MTM.
They are referred to as Mobile Remote Ownership Trusted
Modules (MRTM) and Mobile Local Ownership Trusted Mod-
ules (MLTM). The MRTM supports remote ownership, which
is held either by the device manufacturer or the mobile network
operator, where MLTM supports the user ownership.
The roots of trust in the MTM include the ones discussed
for TPM including RTS, RTM, and RTR. However, the MTM
introduces two new roots of trust: Root of Trust for Verification
(RTV) and Root of Trust for Enforcement (RTE). During
the MTM operations on a trusted mobile platform, we can
logically group different roots of trust; for example RTM and
RTV are grouped together to perform an efficient measure-
verify-extend operation as illustrated in Figure 7. Similarly,
RTS and RTR can be grouped together to provide secure
storage and trustworthiness of the mobile platform.
The MTM operations as shown in Figure 7 begin when a
process starts execution, and they are listed below:
1) The RTM will perform an integrity measurement of the
initiated process.
2) The RTM will register an event that includes the event
data (application/process identifier) and associated in-
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tegrity measurement. The RTM then transfers the exe-
cution to the RTV.
3) The RTV will read the event registered by the RTM.
4) The RTV will then search the event details from the
Reference Integrity Metric (RIM), which includes the
trusted integrity measurements associated with individual
events, populated by the engine owner. This operation
makes the MTM different from the TPM, as the later
does not make any decision regarding the trustworthiness
of the application or process. However, MTM does so via
the comparison performed by the RTV to verify that the
integrity measurement performed by the RTM matches
the one stored in the RIM. If the integrity measurement
does not match, the MTM will terminate the execution or
disable the process. If the verification is successful then
it will proceed with steps 5 and 6 along with sanctioning
the execution (step 7).
5) The RTV will register the event in the measurement logs.
These logs give the order in which the measurements
were made to generate the final (present) value of the
associated PCR.
6) The RTV will extend the associated PCR value that is
stored in the MTM.
7) If verification is successful, it will sanction the execution
of the process.
C. Trusted Computing: An Architecture on the Rebound?
Since its inception, the TPM has been the subject of
adverse reaction from the community (i.e. common users,
organisations and researchers). The issue with TPM initially
revolved around the argument of “big” corporations trying to
take the control of computers away from their owners. Such
concerns were addressed by the TPM providing control of
the TPM to the owner and significantly improving the overall
privacy architecture for reporting mechanisms.
Another concern was based on the TPM design goals that
stated it could provide a platform for potentially “secure and
unhackable” Digital Rights Management (DRM) frameworks.
This again raised concerns regarding the control that a com-
puter owner exercises over her computer.
These two concerns overshadowed the potentially beneficial
features of the TPM, like secure boot, secure storage and
secure management of cryptographic keys. Increasing numbers
of PCs now have built-in TPM, although a substantial number
of these modules are not enabled by their respective users.
Similarly, there are not many applications that use TPM
features to provide added security and privacy services to their
customers. Therefore, it seems that there are no strong reasons
for an end-user to actively use the TPM for his/her security
and privacy requirements.
With increasing reliance on computing platforms, the TPM
will increasingly play a crucial role in providing secure com-
puting platforms. In addition, general users are also becoming
aware of the potential security issues that might lead them
to activate their TPMs. However, while the adoption of the
TPM may increase, the specification is not changing with
the changing landscape of computing technologies. There are
many competing technologies that provide similar services to
TPM: examples include AEGIS [35], ARM TrustZone [5] and
M-Shield [6]. Most of these technologies extend the traditional
features of the TPM and provide runtime (execution) security
and trust services.
In next section we will look at a few of the emerging spaces
where TPM could play a role in providing secure and trusted
computing environments. To accommodate the requirements
of these emerging technologies, TPM specifications have to
be flexible.
IV. TRUSTED COMPUTING AND THE CHANGING
LANDSCAPE
In this section, we discuss the emergence of mobile plat-
forms, cloud computing and CPS along with their potential
requirements.
A. Mobile Platforms
With the advent of smart phones and the concept of “Apps,”
the mobile platform is becoming the core device an end-user
will use to access different services over the internet or in
the real world. For example, mobile banking enables a user to
access his/her bank account from a mobile phone. Similarly,
Near Field Communication (NFC) [36] is enabling mobile
phones to communicate directly with physical devices (e.g.
access control points) without requiring the internet.
TCG proposed MTM as an important step, but its adoption
is not widespread. In addition, the features and access required
by many of the security-sensitive services on a smart phone,
like EMV specifications (for debit and credit cards) [37] are
not satisfied by the MTM. In sections V-A we discuss the our
proposed architecture that can support trusted computing for
mobile platforms.
B. Cloud Computing
Cloud computing is emerging as the ‘next big thing’ in the
IT landscape. Cloud computing provides scalability, flexibility
and elasticity to organisations that can provision resources
depending upon the work load, thus efficiently managing their
requirements. However, most cloud services are provided by
third parties, which means that the data storage and processing
will be off-site. In addition, most of the services provided to
cloud users are virtualised. This might isolate the services from
directly accessing the hardware, especially secure hardware
(i.e. TPM).
For sensitive services like health care, moving to the cloud
is not straightforward. They have to get the cloud service
provider to make an offline agreement (official contract gov-
erned by local regulations/laws of the country where the health
care provider resides) regarding the security and storage of
data [38].
Trusted computing for cloud services is mainly focused on
the design of effective soft trust-based architectures [39, 40].
Other approaches advocate the collection of data provenance
to increase the awareness of data in third-party cloud services
[38, 41, 42]. However, the importance of trusted computing
for cloud services is accepted. In addition, there is potential
for trusted computing to become crucial to cloud computing
as its adoption increases. In section V-B, we look at how
hard trust-based mechanisms can be built for cloud computing
environments.
C. Cyber-Physical Systems
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are collections of embedded
devices that control/manage physical entities. CPSs are de-
ployed in diverse fields including the automotive industry, civil
infrastructure, energy, healthcare and consumer appliances.
CPSs are being developed so that that they construct a col-
laborative architecture, not only among the embedded devices
in a single CPS but also extending to inter-CPS collaborative
architectures. Potentially, CPSs may out-number any other
computing environment by a large margin in the near future
[43].
The CPS will be ubiquitous in modern life and it has
the potential to interconnect different computing environments
with the physical world. Such an environment has the potential
to be the prime target of malicious entities. Therefore, in
order to provide reliable and efficiently protected services,
trusted computing becomes a crucial part of the CPS [44].
In section V-C. We discuss the idea of trusted computing
platforms for individual embedded devices, and of building
a trusted environment from individual devices in the CPS to
create a collaborative architecture of trust.
V. BEYOND TRADITIONAL TRUSTED COMPUTING
PLATFORMS – OUR PROPOSALS
In this section, we discuss our proposed architectures that
go beyond the traditional notion of trusted computing and their
applications in different computing domains.
A. Consumer Centric Trusted Device
The adoption of mobile phones and tablet-based computing
platforms (e.g. iPads) is increasing. To some extent, the
security and privacy issues of personal computers, including
insecure execution environments, also apply to hand-held
devices. As reliance on these devices increases, so will threats
to the security and privacy of the platform and its users.
For example, a healthcare mobile application, if it is badly
designed and is subsequently compromised, may reveal users’
sensitive medical information.
A possible solution is to have a tamper-resistant execu-
tion environment that executes a programme in a trusted,
secure, reliable, and fault-tolerant environment. Among widely
deployed tamper-resistant devices, two are prominent: the
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [33], and smart cards [45].
The TPM provides a platform’s integrity measurement with
cryptographic protection, in contrast to smart cards that pro-
vide a generic execution environment, in which an applica-
tion can execute and store application code and data. This
landscape maps from smart cards, mobile phones, tablets and
general-purpose computers through to Machine-to-Machine
communication and the Internet of Things [9]. It would be
beneficial to have an interoperable unified architecture that
provides a secure and reliable execution and storage environ-
ment for different computing devices.
A User-Centric Tamper-Resistant Device (UCTD) is a “one”
end user device that provides a unified architecture [46]. Figure
8 shows different possible form factors for the UCTD, various
applications that it can host, and different industries that can
use the provided functionality. As UCTD is based on the User
Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) architecture
[50], it requires the Trusted Execution & Environment Man-
ager (TEM) [32] to provide security and trust assurance.
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Figure 8. Illustration of UCTD form factors, application areas, and industry
sectors
B. Trusted Cloud Computing
A generic logical architecture of cloud computing is illus-
trated in Figure 9, except for the trusted platform hardware,
trusted platform OS and virtualised trusted agents. The hard-
ware layer consists of processing and storage hardware. The
processing hardware supports the execution environment (i.e.
CPU, RAM, networking etc.), and storage hardware provides
a data store. The processing platform Operating System (OS)
manages communication between the cloud orchestrator and
the processing hardware. Similarly, the storage platform OS
facilitates communication between the cloud orchestrator and
the storage hardware. The cloud orchestrator manages the
resource allocations, networking and storage associated with
individual virtual machines. Virtual machines are instances
of clients’ desired operating systems running in a virtualised
environment to support their business requirements.
For hard trust, additional components are included in the
generic architecture of cloud computing, thus providing a
hardware-based trust assurance framework. These components
are trusted platform hardware (e.g. TPM chip) and associated
platforms (e.g. TPM functionalities). These trusted hardware
and platforms are depicted as isolated segments of the cloud
architecture, where in actual deployment they would be part of
the processing and storage architectures. Each virtual machine
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Figure 9. Trusted Computing Architecture for Cloud Computing
can have a dedicated virtual trusted agent [47]. These virtual
trusted agents can be built on the roots of trust provided
by the underlying trusted platform (OS and hardware). This
architecture can also support hybrid trust, where reputation-,
context-, and content-based trust mechanisms can build on top
of the trusted platform and virtual trusted agents.
C. Trusted Computing for Embedded Devices
For embedded devices, especially smart cards, a trusted en-
tity known as the Trusted Execution & Environment Manager
(TEM) has been proposed [32].
Such an entity would play a crucial role in establishing
the trustworthiness of smart cards [48], platform assurance
[49], smart card firewall mechanisms [50], trusted execution
environments and smart card content backup/restoration mech-
anisms [51].
From the point of view of different stake-holders in various
embedded devices (e.g. smart card), a TEM provides, at a
minimum, the following services.
1) Confidence in Current State: Provides assurance and
validation that the state of a smart card (software and
hardware) is as secure as it was at the time of CC
evaluation.
2) Trust in the Downloaded Application: Ensures that the
application is downloaded and personalised in a secure
and reliable fashion. Provides proof to the appropriate SP
that there was no modification of the application during
the download and installation process.
3) Secure State and Application Sharing: Provides assurance
and validation services which an application can use to
validate its current state, and verify the state of other ap-
plication(s) with which it establishes application sharing.
4) Secure Execution: Provides a trusted execution environ-
ment which ensures that an application is executed in a
trusted and secure environment.
5) Simulator Detection: Provides verification and validation
mechanisms to ascertain both the existence of a smart
card and that the item is not a smart card simulator
(hardware genuineness [52]).
The overall architecture of a UCOM-based smart card is
illustrated in Figure 10. The TEM is illustrated as a layer
between the smart card hardware and the runtime environment.
This illustration provides a semantic view of the architecture
and does not imply that all communication between the
runtime environment and the hardware goes through the TEM.
Smart Card Runtime Environment (SCRT)
Smart Card Firewall
Platform Space Application Space
Native Code
Smart Card Hardware
Trusted Environment & Execution Manager (TEM)
Figure 10. Smart Card Architecture in with TEM
After analysing the TPM requirements [33], it is apparent
that the basic building blocks in the hardware required to build
a TPM chip are already available on smart cards. Therefore,
most of the functionality of the TEM is implemented in
software and it would not impose any additional hardware
requirement on the host platform [32].
Figure 10 depicts native code and smart card hardware
as complementary components of the TEM. This is because
the TEM does not need separate hardware for its operations.
It will utilise the existing services provided by the smart
card hardware. To avoid duplicating the code, the TEM uses
the native code implementation of cryptographic services like
encryption/decryption, digital signature and random number
generation.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we illustrated the difference between the
notions of digital trust in different computing domains. The
point of this discussion was to highlight that the definition
of digital trust which is valid in one domain may not remain
valid when applied to a different domain. Therefore, when
discussing the notion of and potential models/frameworks for
digital trust, the targeted domain should be properly scoped. In
subsequent sections, we discussed digital trust for security and
trust computing. In this discussion, we briefly elaborated on
the traditional concepts of TPM and MTM and their relevance
in today’s changing technological landscape. Next, we put
forward the next challenges that trusted computing faces,
which include mobile platforms, cloud computing and cyber-
physical systems. To satisfy the requirements of trusted com-
puting and at the same time also accommodate these emerging
technologies would require some fundamental modifications
to the existing architecture for trusted computing. Finally, we
described a wide range of proposals that built on traditional
trusted computing but are extending it so they can satisfy the
requirements of emerging technologies.
It can be argued that the concept of trusted computing
is re-emerging and it might have a crucial role to play in
future technologies. The challenge is how to create a trusted
computing architecture that is flexible, extendable and scalable
while providing the strongest possible security guarantees.
How can we design a unified trusted computing architecture in
a manner that can support security, privacy and trust-evaluation
requirements ranging from the very small (e.g. embedded
devices) to the very large (e.g. High Performance Computing)?
These are important questions which should be considered by
all in the trust management research and practice community.
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